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Abstract
This paper examines how much of the diﬀerence in the size of the informal sector and
in per capita income across countries can be accounted by regulation costs (barriers to
legality) and contractual imperfections in ﬁnancial markets (legal failures). It constructs
and solves numerically a general equilibrium model with credit constrained heterogenous
agents, occupational choices over formal and informal businesses, contractual imperfec-
tions and a government sector which imposes taxes and regulations on formal ﬁrms. The
premium from formalization is better access to outside ﬁnance. Diﬀerences in regula-
tion costs and the degree of enforcement in ﬁnancial contracts endogenously generate
diﬀerences in the size of the informal sector and in total factor productivity (TFP). The
numerical exercises suggest that: (i) regulation costs and not ﬁnancial market imperfec-
tions account for the diﬀerence in the size of the informal sector between United States and
Mediterranean Europe; (ii) this is not the case for countries with very weak enforcement
systems, such as Peru, as both contractual imperfections and regulation costs account for
the observed diﬀerence in the size of the informal sector. Regarding output per capita,
regulation costs and the strength of enforcement explain roughly 60% of the diﬀerence in
observed international incomes.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E6; O11; O17
Keywords: inequality; credit constraints; corruption; informal sector
1 Introduction
A fundamental issue in economic development is to study the determinants of the informal
(unregulated) sector. Why does the size of the informal sector vary so much across countries?
Informal production accounts for roughly 10 percent of total production in the United States
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1and this statistic is about 25 and 60 percent in Italy and Peru, respectively.1 De Soto (1989)
emphasizes that informal production in developing countries is mainly driven by entry bar-
riers, under the form of regulation and corruption, that entrepreneurs face to acquire legal
status. Empirical studies have corroborated this hypothesis.2 In a cross-section of 85 countries,
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) show that stricter regulation of entry3
is associated with sharply higher levels of corruption, and a greater relative size of the unoﬃcial
economy.
Recently, De Soto (2000) suggests that these barriers to legality are not only important to
explain diﬀerences in the size of the informal sector but also diﬀerences in per capita income
across countries. His idea is that, without legal status, entrepreneurs cannot exercise full
property rights over their assets, and, as a consequence, cannot use their wealth as collateral
for a loan and cannot generate capital from their savings. Due to these legal failures, they, in
general, under-invest and are locked into running low productivity technologies.
This paper investigates the role of corruption, regulation (barriers to legality) and credit
market imperfections (legal failures) in accounting for diﬀerences in the size of the unoﬃcial
economy across countries. We put forth a general equilibrium model to address De Soto’s
(2000) hypothesis analytically and quantitatively. Agents in our framework can choose to be
either a worker or an (informal or formal) entrepreneur. In this respect, this paper is related
to Lucas’ (1978) “span of control” model, which was later extended by Rauch (1991) in his
study of informal production. Unlike these models, ours is built upon a dynamic framework
and uses credit constraints in the analysis of occupational choice. Agents are diﬀerentiated
by entrepreneurial ability and initial wealth. They care about their own consumption and the
initial wealth of their oﬀspring. In order to open a formal/informal business, agents must buy
capital in advance to ﬁnance their project. Capital markets are imperfect and therefore the
best project will not necessarily be undertaken. This interaction between wealth distribution
and capital market imperfection is based on Banerjee and Newman (1993).4
The theoretical environment, therefore, considers three occupational choices (worker, and
formal or informal entrepreneur), inequality in wealth and in entrepreneurial ideas, corruption
and regulation, and limited enforcement. Occupational choices and the size of each project are
determined endogenously. They depend on the agent’s “type” (wealth and project), start up
costs, and credit market imperfections. Diﬀerent levels of bureaucracy and limited enforcement
generate not only diﬀerences in the occupational choice (size of the informal sector), but also
diﬀerences in total factor productivity (TFP). Our model therefore provides a theory of diﬀer-
ences in TFP, as required by Prescott (1998), that maps diﬀerences in corruption and limited
enforcement into diﬀerences in observed TFP.5
Our quantitative experiments based on the empirical evidence on the size of the informal
sector, regulation costs and the degree of enforcement across countries suggest that: (i) regu-
lation costs rather than ﬁnancial market imperfections, account for the diﬀerence in the size
of the informal sector between United States and Mediterranean Europe; however, (ii) this is
not the case for countries with very weak enforcement systems (property rights), such as Peru:
1See table 1 (column 1) in section 4. See Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1998), Schneider and
Enste (2000), and Friedman, Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) for additional data, and for an
extensive discussion of the underground economy.
2See Friedman et al. (2000) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002).
3They evaluate all formal procedures that an entrepreneur needs to carry out to begin legally operating a
ﬁrm.
4See also Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000) for a close framework which studies the macroeconomic and
distributional dynamics associated with the process of economic development. They develop important tools
that we use to characterize the long-run dynamics of our model economy.
5Antunes and Cavalcanti (2003) and Erosa and Cabrillana (2004) also develop model economies where capital
market imperfections and regulation costs endogenously generate diﬀerences in TFP.
2both contractual imperfections and regulation costs account for the observed diﬀerence in the
size of the informal sector. Regarding diﬀerences in output per capita across countries, limited
enforcement and corruption costs explain roughly 60% of the diﬀerence in observed interna-
tional incomes. Therefore, the model accounts for the diﬀerence in informal sector sizes across
countries, but just part of the diﬀerence in output per capita.
Another important empirical fact is also consistent with our exercises: the proportion of
small scale activities is negatively related with per capita income levels. Tybout (2000), for
instance, shows that government regulations and taxes are enforced only among large ﬁrms.
In order to avoid the costs associated with formal production, entrepreneurs scale down the
size of their ﬁrms and operate outside the realm of government regulation. This result arises
endogenously in our economy.
There is a long tradition in economics to study the hidden economy. One branch of the
literature studies the eﬀects of the informal sector on growth and government policies.6 Another
branch, which is more related to this study, investigates the determinants of the hidden economy.
Among the empirical studies it is important to highlight the work of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), and of Friedman, Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton (2000).
Djankov et al. (2002) emphasize the role of start up costs to generate large informal sectors,
while Friedman et al. (2000) suggest that it is not tax rates7 per se that induce entrepreneurs
to go underground, but bureaucracy and a weak legal system. Their ﬁndings are consistent
with our quantitative results. We contribute to this literature by speciﬁcally identifying cases
in which corruption or start up costs are the main determinant of the hidden economy.
With respect to the theoretical studies,8 Rauch’s (1991) model suggests that entrepreneurs
go underground to avoid minimum wages. Consequently, in their model the formal equilibrium
wage rate is higher than that in the informal sector.9 In Dessy and Pallage (2003) entrepreneurs
become legal because they can use productive infrastructure (which enters in the production
function), while in our model the beneﬁt from formalization is better access to outside ﬁnance.
Quintin (2002) has a similar premium from formalization. Our model is diﬀerent from his
because we add bureaucracy costs and bequest transfers to the analysis. Regulation costs are
empirically and quantitatively important to determine the size of the informal sector and the
interaction between credit constraints and bequest inequality is key for occupational choice.
Finally, a literature on two sector growth models and economic development is also related
to our quantitative theoretical analysis. Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000), for instance,
introduce home production, while Restuccia (2004) considers a traditional and a modern sector
in a Neoclassical growth model. Similar to our model, these economies can generate larger
diﬀerences in “oﬃcial” output levels across countries than standard models for a given pol-
icy diﬀerential. In our model technologies will be the same in each sector but diﬀerences in
productivity will arise endogenously due to policies that aﬀect diﬀerently each sector.10
6Easterly (1993) and Loayza (1996) show that growth is negatively related to informal production. Cavalcanti
and Villamil (2003) show how the optimal monetary policy and the welfare costs of inﬂation might be aﬀected
by the size of the informal sector through tax evasion.
7They argue that the burden of tax rates has two eﬀects: (i) it drives agents into the informal sector to avoid
oﬃcial taxes; but (ii) it can also raise revenue to improve government institutions and enforcement, which leads
to a lower informal sector. In general, these two eﬀects oﬀset each other, and the relationship between tax rates
and the size of the informal sector across countries is not statistically signiﬁcant.
8An interesting article is Azuma and Grossman (2002). They study a related but diﬀerent question: why do
governments impose or tolerate burdensome taxes, bribes and bureaucracy that lead many producers to operate
in the informal sector?
9See Amaral and Quintin (2003) for a model where diﬀerences in worker’s characteristics and in the wage
rate arise endogenously due to better investment opportunities in the formal sector. The question that they
address is diﬀerent from ours. They explain why informal production emphasizes low-skill work.
10Related to this result is Guner, Ventura and Yi (2004), who consider a model with occupational choice and
investigate the eﬀects of restrictions on size on productivity.
3This paper is divided as follows: the next section describes the model economy. Section
3 describes the agents’ optimal behavior, deﬁnes the competitive equilibrium allocations, and
presents some analytical results. Section 4 solves the model numerically and conducts policy
experiments. The last section provides some concluding remarks and policy implications.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences
In each time period (t = 0,1,2,...), the economy consists of a continuum of individuals in
the unit interval. Each agent lives and is productive for one period, then reproduces another
individual so that the population is constant. Agents care about their own consumption and
leave bequests to their oﬀspring. Let ci
t and bi
t+1 denote consumption and bequests, respectively,








1−γ, γ ∈ (0,1). (1)
This utility function implies that agents are risk-neutral with respect to income as the indirect
utility function is linear in wealth. This implies that any additive punishment or reward in
utility may be measured in terms of income. Notice that, for tractability, we assume that
preferences are for the bequest and not the oﬀspring’s utility (Banerjee and Newman, 1993,
Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000).
2.2 Endowments
Each individual can be either a worker or an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs create jobs and
manage their labor force, n. As in Lucas (1978a) each individual is endowed with a talent
for managing, xi, drawn from a continuous cumulative probability distribution function Γ(x)
with ﬁnite support [x,x], where x ≥ 0. Therefore, in each period agents are distinguished by
their initial wealth and ability as entrepreneurs, (bi
t,xi
t). We assume that the agent’s talent for
managing is not hereditary. For notational convenience, in the remainder of the paper we drop
agent superscript i.
2.3 Production technologies
Managers operate a technology that uses labor, n, and capital, k to produce a single consump-
tion good, y, that is represented by
y = xk
αn
β, α, β > 0, and α + β < 1. (2)
Capital fully depreciates each period. Managers can operate only one project. Entrepreneurs
can choose to declare their establishments (formal sector) or to work in the shadow economy
(informal sector). In order to operate in the formal sector, entrepreneurs must pay a start up
cost, ς, in the form of complying with regulations and corruption. This cost is assumed to be
independent of ﬁrm output since it is an ex-ante payment to the government. This is a barrier
to become formal. De Soto (1989, 2000) has shown that this cost varies across countries and
is especially high in developing countries. Firms that are legally declared also pay a uniform
payroll tax, τ. Informal ﬁrms do not pay any start up costs or taxes. We might assume that
informal ﬁrms pay ﬁnes in case they are detected by the tax authority and assume that the
expected punishment rate in the informal sector is a fraction of output, ηy, where η ∈ [0,1].11
11ηy can also be seen as the costs associated with hiding information for operating in the shadow economy.
4This parameter, however, does not add any insights about the eﬀects of corruption costs and
limited enforcement on the size of the informal sector. We, therefore, do not use it in the
analysis.
2.4 The capital market
Agents can borrow capital from a ﬁnancial intermediary with access to perfect outside capital
markets, in which a risk-free bond earns a gross return of r ≥ 1. Let l be the amount of
funds that an agent borrows from the ﬁnancial intermediary. In order to ﬁnance their projects,
constrained agents must put up their initial wealth, b, as collateral. Borrowers cannot commit
ex-ante to their individual promises and can avoid the repayment obligation, rl, by defaulting
on their debt and loosing rb. Those that renege on their debt loose the collateral and incur a cost
proportional to what was produced, φy. This is equivalent to an additive utility punishment.
This cost reﬂects the strength of contract enforcement in the economy.12 Higher φ means a
better quality of the legal system. The point here is that, in contrast to Banerjee and Newman
(1993), not only the quality of the enforcement system will be an important determinant of
external debt, but also the quality of the project.13 Since contracts are easily monitored in
the formal sector, we assume for simplicity that φ is zero in the informal sector.14 This is
consistent with De Soto (2000), who points out that projects and assets in the informal sector
are not adequately documented and therefore “cannot be turned into capital or cannot be used
as a collateral for a loan.” Loans will be limited by the agents’ inheritance and the degree that
contracts are enforced.
Notice that resource allocation involves the division of individuals among formal and infor-
mal managers and workers, and then the allocation of factors of production among managers.
Occupational choices will be driven by the agent’s type, (b,x), the eﬃciency of the capital
market, φ, and government tax and regulation, τ and ς.
3 Optimal behavior and equilibrium
3.1 Entrepreneurs
Those who have enough resources and managerial ability to become entrepreneurs choose the
level of capital and the number of employees to maximize proﬁt subject to the technological
constraint. Since capital markets are imperfect, let us describe the problem of an entrepreneur
for a given level of capital k. Let IF be an indicator function that takes value one when j = F,






j − (1 + τIF)wnj, (3)








12We chose a proportional punishment for convenience. This follows the literature. See Krasa and Villamil
(2000) and Krasa, Sharma and Villamil (2004) for extended analysis of enforcement and debt contracts.
13 Several studies have shown (see, in particular, Cohn and Coleman, 2000) that proﬁtability of the ﬁrm is an
important predictor of external debt, suggesting that lenders may use individual and business characteristics to
evaluate projects.
14Strictly speaking, in a simple debt contract the creditor gets everything. Of course debtors can hide assets.
Firms in the informal sector are better able to hide information and therefore φ is lower for them. In the limit
φ = 0 in the informal sector.
5Substituting (4) into (3) yields the entrepreneur’s proﬁt function for a given level of capital,










In an environment where enforcement is perfect and the entire production is given back to the
ﬁnancier in case of default, φ = 1, managers will solve the following problem
max
kj≥0
πj(kj,x;w) − r(kj + ςIF). (6)














Since agents cannot commit to their promises, debt contracts must be self-enforcing. Let a be
the amount of capital that is self-ﬁnanced (or used as collateral) and l be the amount of funds
raised in the outside capital market. The income from running a project is
Vj(b,x;w) = max
0≤aj≤b, lj≥0
πj(aj + lj,x;w) − r(aj + lj + ςIF) (8)
subject to
πj(aj + lj,x;w) − r(aj + lj + ςIF) ≥ (1 − φIF)πj(aj + lj,x;w) − raj.
This problem yields optimal policy functions aj(b,x;w) and lj(b,x;w), and we deﬁne the optimal
policy function for capital as kj(b,x;w) = aj(b,x;w)+lj(b,x;w). The restriction is an incentive
compatibility constraint, which guarantees that individual promises will be fulﬁlled (Kehoe and





πj(aj(b,x;w) + lj(b,x;w),x;w) − ς

IF.
It can be shown that constrained entrepreneurs put their entire wealth in the project as long
as b ≤ k∗
j(x;w).15 This implies that the size of a project of an entrepreneur (b,x) is such that




πF(b + l(b,x;w),x;w) − ς

IF. (9)
Therefore, projects are limited by the agents’ inheritance and the incompleteness of the capital
market.
The following lemma summarizes the value of undertaking each project:
Lemma 1 For any x ∈ [x,x], and w > 0, the value function Vj(b,x;w), and the associated
policy function lj(b,x;w) for j ∈ {F,I} have the following properties:
1. Vj(b,x;w) is continuous and diﬀerentiable in x and w. If x > 0, it is also strictly increas-
ing in x and strictly decreasing in w.
2. For b < k∗
j(x;w), Vj(b,x;w) is continuous, diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing in b.
For b > k∗




63. For all b and x, lI(b,x;w) = 0. lF(b,x;w) is strictly increasing for b < k∗
F(x;w) and
lF(b,x;w) = 0 for b > k∗
F(x;w).
Proof. See appendix B.
It is important to highlight the trade-oﬀs governing the decision to operate in each sector. In
the informal sector entrepreneurs do not pay the payroll tax and the start up cost, but projects
are limited by the agents’ initial wealth. In the formal sector, managers have access to the
ﬁnancial market, but have to pay taxes and costs associated with regulation and corruption.
3.2 Occupational choice
The occupational choice of each agent deﬁnes his lifetime income. For any w > 0, an agent
(b,x) will become an entrepreneur if (b,x) ∈ E(w), where
E(w) = {(b,x) ∈ [0,∞) × [x,x] : max{VF(b,x;w),VI(b,x;w)} ≥ w}. (10)
Let Ec(w) denote the complement set of E(w) in [0,∞) × [x,x]. Obviously, if (b,x) ∈ Ec(w),
then agents are workers. Among those who are able to operate a business, they will become a
formal entrepreneur if (b,x) ∈ EF(w) ⊆ E(w), where
EF(w) = {(b,x) ∈ E(w) : VF(b,x;w) ≥ VI(b,x;w)}. (11)
They operate in the informal sector if (b,x) ∈ EI(w) ⊆ E(w), where
EI(w) = {(b,x) ∈ E(w) : VI(b,x;w) > VF(b,x;w)}. (12)
The inequality is strict by convention. The following lemma characterizes the occupational
choice for a given bequest and entrepreneurial ability.
Lemma 2 Deﬁne be(x;w) as the curve in the (b,x) plane such that (b,x) ∈ [0,∞)×[x,x] and
max{VF(b,x;w),VI(b,x;w)} = w. Then there exists x∗(w) such that
∂be(x;w)
∂x < 0 for x > x∗(w)
and
∂be(x;w)
∂x = −∞ for x = x∗(w).
1. For all x, if b < be(x;w), then (b,x) ∈ Ec(w).
2. For all x, if b ≥ be(x;w), then (b,x) ∈ E(w).
In addition, deﬁne bs(x;w) as the curve in the (b,x) plane such that (b,x) ∈ [0,∞) × [x,x]
and VF(b,x;w) = VI(b,x;w).
3. For all x, if b ≥ be(x;w) and b > bs(x;w), then (b,x) ∈ EI(w).
4. For all x, if b ≥ be(x;w) and b ≤ bs(x;w), then (b,x) ∈ EF(w).
Proof. See appendix C.
Figure 1 illustrates this lemma. It shows the occupational choice in the (b,x) space for the
baseline economy (see parameters in section 4). Lemma 2 and ﬁgure 1 suggest that agents are
workers when the quality of their project is low, i.e., x < x∗(w) (the lightest shaded area). For
x ≥ x∗(w), then agents might become entrepreneurs depending if they are credit constrained
or not (notice that for very low bequests agents are workers even though their entrepreneurial
ability is higher than x∗(w)). The negative association between be(x;w) and x suggests that
managers with better projects need a lower level of initial wealth to run a project. This is rather
















Figure 1: Firm size distribution in the formal and informal sectors.
in the informal sector, unconstrained entrepreneurs will stay illegal. Constrained entrepreneurs
will operate in the informal sector only if the premium from formalization (access to outside
ﬁnance) is not high enough. Since this premium increases with the quality of the project, only
high-productivity projects will operate in the formal sector (darkest shaded area). The area in
between the darkest and lightest shaded areas corresponds to managers in the informal sector.
The size of the informal sector depends on the institutional and policy parameters τ, ς and
φ, as well as on distribution Γ.
3.3 Consumers
In period t, the lifetime wealth of an agent characterized by (bt,xt) is given by
Yt = Y (bt,xt;wt) = max{wt,VF(bt,xt;wt),VI(bt,xt;wt)} + rbt. (13)
Lifetime wealth is thus a function of agent-speciﬁc bt and xt, and economy-wide wt. Given
lifetime wealth, (13), agents choose consumption and bequests to maximize preferences (1).
This problem deﬁnes the optimal consumption, ct = c(Yt), and bequest, bt+1 = b(Yt), policies.
The functional form of (1) implies that agents leave a proportion 1−γ of their lifetime wealth
as a bequest. Notice that bequests cannot be negative because every agent is allowed to become
8a worker. Deﬁne zt = (bt,xt) and let Wt be the bequest distribution at period t.16
3.4 Competitive equilibrium
Deﬁnition 3 Given (τ,φ,ς), Γ and Wt, equilibrium at date t is a list wt, {nj(x;wt)}j∈{F,I},
{lj(b,x;wt)}j∈{F,I}, {aj(b,x;wt)}j∈{F,I}, {Vj(b,x;wt)}j∈{F,I}, ct = c(·), bt+1 = b(·), such that:
A. Given the wage rate and government policies, an agent of type (b,x) chooses his occu-
pation to maximize his lifetime wealth, (13).
B. lj(b,x;wt) and aj(b,x;wt) solve (8) for j ∈ {F,I}.
C. Given the lifetime wealth, (13), each agent maximizes utility, (1).
D. Given the wage rate, technology constraint, credit markets, and government policies,
formal and informal entrepreneurs select their labor force to maximize proﬁts, (3).










In the quantitative exercises it is important to evaluate policy experiments in “stable”
economies, where, for instance, the real wage and income distribution are not changing signiﬁ-
cantly over time. Indeed, it is possible to show that when policies and institutions are stationary
a unique steady-state equilibrium exists (i.e., an equilibrium with a constant real wage, w, and
invariant distribution, H = WΓ) and from any initial condition the economy converges to this
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique stationary equilibrium with 0 < w < ∞ and invariant
distribution W. In addition, for any initial bequest distribution W0 and stationary government
policies and institutions, the bequest distribution converges to W.
Proof. See appendix D.
In the calibration and quantitative experiments we will study the economy in this partic-




In order to solve the model numerically we have to choose a functional form for the ability
distribution and assign values to the parameters of the model. We parameterized the model
such that, in the stationary equilibrium, we could match some key empirical observations of
the United States economy.
16See the deﬁnition of Wt in appendix D.
9Table 1: Selected Statistics. Sources: Informal sector size is from Schneider and Enste (2000, tables 2, 3 and 7), and Friedman et al. (2000, table 1, ﬁrst
column), and is total production in the informal sector as a share of GDP. Oﬃcial GDP per capita is the Gross Domestic Product per capita in U.S.
dollars in 1999 (World Bank, 2001). Unoﬃcial GDP per capita is calculated using the ﬁrst and the second columns above. For countries with a range of
informal sector sizes, the upper limit was used. Regulation costs are from Djankov et al. (2002, table 3, column 8). They are direct costs as a fraction of
GDP per capita that entrepreneurs face to meet government regulations. Eﬃciency of the judicial system, protection against expropriation, rule of law,
and risk of contract repudiation are from La Porta et al. (1998, table 5, columns 1, 2, 4, and 5). The last column is the average from columns 5 to 8.
Informal Oﬃcial Unoﬃcial Regulation Eﬃciency Protection Rule of Risk of average
Country sector GDP per GDP per costs of judicial against law contract enforc.
size, % capita capita sytem expropriat. repudiat.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Denmark 9.4 32,030 35,041 0.1000 10.00 9.67 10.00 9.31 9.74
Canada 14.8 19,320 22,179 0.0145 9.25 9.67 10.00 8.96 9.47
Germany 13.2 25,350 28,696 0.1569 9.00 9.90 9.23 9.77 9.47
France 13.8 23,480 26,720 0.1430 8.00 9.65 9.05 9.19 8.97
United States 10 30,600 33,660 0.0049 10.00 9.98 10.00 9.00 9.74
Belgium 15.3 24,510 28,260 0.0998 9.50 9.63 10.00 9.48 9.65
Portugal 22.1 10,600 12,942 0.1844 5.50 8.90 8.68 8.57 7.91
Spain 22.4 14,000 17,136 0.1730 6.25 9.52 7.80 8.40 7.99
Italy 26 19,710 24,834 0.2002 6.75 9.35 8.33 9.17 8.40
Argentina 21.8 7,600 9,257 0.1019 6.00 5.91 5.35 4.91 5.54
Brazil 35 4,420 5,967 0.2014 5.75 7.62 6.32 6.30 6.50
Peru 60 2,390 3,824 0.1986 6.75 5.54 2.50 4.68 4.87
Nigeria 76 310 546 2.5700 7.25 5.33 2.73 4.36 4.92
1
0Table 2: Parameter values, baseline economy.
γ 0.8 τ 0.33
β 0.55 ς 0.0004
α 0.35 φ 0.25
r 2  6
Table 3: Basic statistics, US and baseline economy. Sources: Schneider and Enste (2000), World
Bank (2001) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2002); all ﬁgures in percentage.
US economy Baseline economy
Informal sector size 10 10
Regulation and corruption costs 0.5 0.5
Income Gini 40–44 34
% of entrepreneurs 9 9
Table 2 summarizes the parameter values, which were determined as follows.17 We interpret
the model period to be 35 years and we let r = 2, which implies an yearly real interest rate of
roughly 2 percent. We set α and β such that about 55 percent of income is paid to labor, 35
percent is paid to the remuneration of capital, and 10 percent are proﬁts.18 We chose a payroll
tax of τ = 0.33, which is consistent with the literature (Jones, Manuelli and Rossi, 1993). The
share of bequests in the instantaneous utility function, 1 − γ, was taken to be 0.2, which is
consistent with those estimated by Laitner and Juster (1996). Finally, we assumed that the
entrepreneurial cumulative distribution function is Γ(x) = Ax
1
 and we normalized the support
of this distribution to the [0,1] interval, so that A = 1.19 We chose parameters , φ and ς
such that the size of the informal sector was 10 percent, the percentage of entrepreneurs in the
steady-state equilibrium was 9 percent, and regulation costs were around 0.5 percent20 of GDP
per capita.
The baseline economy reproduces statistics consistent with those of the US economy, except
for the income Gini coeﬃcient (table 3). Since every worker receives the same wage in the model
economy, the model income Gini coeﬃcient should underestimate its real world counterpart.
The income Gini coeﬃcient when we consider only entrepreneurs’ income is higher in the data.
For instance, data in Quadrini (1999) imply a value around 45 percent for the US economy. In
our model the Gini index for entrepreneurs’ income is roughly 49 percent, which is close to the
data. We therefore shall focus less on inequality and more on the other key statistics.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of capital allocated in the two sectors. It illustrates well the
premium from formalization. The horizontal area (when ability is low) corresponds to those
17Appendix E contains some quantitative results using diﬀerent parameterizations.
18Gollin (2002) argues that it is important to adjust factor income shares by the entrepreneurial income,
which is often treated incorrectly as capital income share. If we input entrepreneurial proﬁts as labor income
as suggested by Gollin, then the eﬀective labor and capital income shares will be 0.65 and 0.35, respectively.
These income shares are those that map our model to those observed in national accounts. If we use another
adjustment also suggested by Gollin, which assume that entrepreneurial income is a mix of labor and capital
income as the rest of the economy, then the eﬀective labor and capital income shares will roughly be 0.61 and
0.39, respectively. In any case, the eﬀective labor income share will be in the range estimated by Gollin, which
goes from 0.60 to 0.80.
19Chaterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and R´ ıos-Rull (2002) use a similar parametric form to generate earnings
distribution in the United States.

















































































Figure 2: Firm size in the formal and informal sectors.
agents that are workers. As the entrepreneurial ability and bequests increase, the size of the
project increases monotonically. The capital in the informal sector, however, is constrained by
initial wealth, which implies that agents with diﬀerent abilities end up having the same level
of capital. On the other hand, in the formal sector the total debt increases with the quality
of the project. This implies that, for a given level of bequest, the amount of capital employed
in this sector is higher for those with better projects. As a consequence, formal entrepreneurs
operate more productive technologies.
Next, we will run some quantitative experiments. We will change corruption costs, ς, and
the level of enforcement, φ, separately to provide their long-run impact on the share of pro-
duction generated outside the realm of government regulation, productivity, and percentage
of entrepreneurs. We will also run experiments by changing these two parameters simultane-
ously. The values of these parameters will be chosen according to the empirical observations
on regulation costs (column (4) of 1) and enforcement (column (9) of 1).
4.2 Contract enforcement versus regulation costs
Contract enforcement
In order to assess how changes in the degree of contract enforcement impact the model, we
map linearly the last column of table 1 to φ, assuming that the US case corresponds to φ = 0.25
12Table 4: Policy Experiments.
Informal Total output Oﬃcial output % of Income
sector size, per capita, per capita, entrepreneurs Gini
% output % of baseline % of baseline
Baseline 10 100 100 9 34
φMed = 0.209; ς
y = 0.005 13.4 94 91 9.4 34
φPeru = 0.13; ς
y = 0.005 28 81 68 10.6 33
φUS = 0.25; ς
y = 0.18 25 94 82 9.1 32
φUS = 0.25; ς
y = 0.20 27 93 79 9.16 32
φMed = 0.209; ς
y = 0.18 31 87 72 10 32
φPeru = 0.13; ς
y = 0.20 63 74 41 11 31
and a zero level of enforcement corresponds to φ = 0. Mediterranean Europe (Italy, Portugal,
Spain) has a value of φ of 0.209, while for Peru (which epitomizes a developing country with a
large informal sector) this ﬁgure is 0.13.
Table 4 shows that when enforcement decreases from the United States level to the Mediter-
ranean Europe level, the size of the informal sector increases from 10% to 13.4%, total output
falls by 6 percent, and measured output decreases by 9 percent. A further decrease of φ to 0.13
(Peru level) yields an increase in the size of the informal sector of 18 percentage points relative
to the baseline economy, while total output falls in 20%.21
From table 4 we can also observe that, as φ decreases, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
total population increases. This is a stylized fact in developing economics: the percentage
of entrepreneurs over the total working population decreases with output per capita. Less
developed countries tend to have more entrepreneurs but less productive entrepreneurs (Lucas,
1978b, Tybout, 2000). When, for instance, enforcement improves, the number of entrepreneurs
decreases but the quality (size and productivity) of each project increases (see also Kumar,
Rajan and Zingales, 2004).
Corruption and regulation costs
We now verify the impacts of corruption costs, ς, on the size of the informal sector and on
productivity. We increased ς from the baseline economy (United States) value (ς = 0.0004),
which corresponds to 0.5% of the output per capita, to 18% of this output (ς = 0.011). This new
value is the average regulation cost as a fraction of output per capita found in Mediterranean
Europe.22 Notice that the informal sector size increases from 10% to 25%, while observed
output per capita decreases by 18%. We further increase corruption costs to the level observed
21Notice that in these experiments we kept ς
y = 0.005. Since output decreases, ς should also decrease to keep
a constant ratio.
22See column (4) of table 1.
13in Peru, which is roughly 20% of the output per capita (ς = 0.013). We observe that the
informal sector size increases to 27% and the output per capita decreases to 79% of the United
States level. Table 4 also contains the results when we change φ and ς simultaneously. As we
can see, these parameters can have a sizeable impact on the size of the informal sector and on
productivity.
Informal sector size: Model simulation and the data
In order to better evaluate the numerical experiments we construct table 5, which contains
the main results from our model simulations (values from table 4) as well as the key statistics
observed in the data from table 1. Let us ﬁrst look at Mediterranean Europe. Table 5 shows
that the strength of ﬁnancial contract enforcement alone cannot account for the diﬀerences
in the size of the informal sector between Mediterranean Europe and the United States. The
model simulation when we only change the enforcement level yields an informal sector size of
13.4%, while in the data it is 24% of output. Corruption and regulation costs, on the other
hand, account for all the diﬀerence in the size of the informal sector between Mediterranean
Europe and the United States. The model simulation when we only change the value of ς
y to the
Mediterranean Europe value yields an informal sector size of 25%. Therefore, it is corruption
costs rather than limited enforcement in ﬁnancial contracts that explains the diﬀerence in the
informal sector size between Mediterranean Europe and the United States.23
For Peru, the picture is somewhat diﬀerent. Model simulations when we change the value
of enforcement and corruption costs separately from the US to the Peru level yield an informal
sector size of 28% and 27%, respectively. These values are roughly a half of the one observed
in the data (60%). The model simulation when we change the two parameters simultaneously
generate an informal sector size of roughly the same magnitude as the one observed in the data.
Therefore, the numerical exercises suggest that contract enforcement accounts for roughly 50%
of the diﬀerence in the size of the informal sector between Peru and the United States, and
corruption accounts for the other half.
TFP: Model simulation and the data
We now focus on the question of whether diﬀerences in contract enforcement and regulation
costs between countries account for the diﬀerences in output per capita and productivity across
countries.
Parente and Prescott (2000) show that the gap in output per capita among rich and poor
countries is explained by diﬀerences in TFP and not by factor accumulation. Their theory,
which is based on technology adoption, shows that inside groups with vested interests block the
adoption of more advanced technologies and explains the use of inferior production processes.24
In our model, diﬀerences in productivity across countries arise endogenously due to diﬀerences
in regulation costs (barriers to legality) and the enforcement system (legal failures). Looking
at the last two columns of table 5 we can assess the relevance of those two factors in explaining
output diﬀerences across countries. Output per capita in Mediterranean Europe is about 55% of
the US output per capita. The model simulation when change both corruption and enforcement
from the baseline to the US level generates an economy that is about 72% as rich as the US.
This leaves another 17% to be explained by other factors that aﬀect TFP, such as vested
interests. The simulation for Peru generates an economy that is about 41% as rich as the US,
23Similar results are found for Western Europe (average values for Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany).
24This clearly could be extended to explain the presence of institutions that inhibit economic development.
Improvements in the judicial system might be blocked by inside groups which beneﬁt from a poor judicial
system. Therefore, granted monopoly rights that generate economic rents to speciﬁc groups can be mapped
into values of φ and ς.
14Table 5: Empirical data and simulation results for reference economies. Mediterranean Europe comprises Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Informal Output per capita,
sector size, % of US level
φ ς
y % of oﬃcial
output Total Oﬃcial
Baseline case 0.25 0.005 10 100 100
Mediterranean Europe (data) 0.209 0.18 24 62 55
Simulation
1) Enforcement 0.209 0.005 13.4 94 91
2) Corruption 0.25 0.18 25 94 82
3) Enforcement and corruption 0.209 0.18 31 87 72
Peru (data) 0.13 0.20 60 11 8
Simulation
1) Enforcement 0.13 0.005 28 81 68
2) Corruption 0.25 0.2 27 93 79
3) Enforcement and Corruption 0.13 0.20 63 74 41
1
5while Peru’s output per capita is roughly 8% of the US level. Finally, for Peru 60 of the gap
in output per capita is explained by corruption costs and contractual imperfections, while the
remaining 32 pp are explained by other factors aﬀecting TFP. In sum, the model corruption
and credit market imperfections explain roughly 60% of the output gap between the US and
other reference economies. These results are still valid if we consider other sets of relatively
homogeneous countries.
4.3 Capital income share
In this section we study the robustness of our results to a higher capital income share. As
Parente and Prescott (2000) argue, measuring the capital stock is usually problematic and the
National Income Statistics usually underestimate the role of capital in the economy. Intangible
capital, such as organization and human capital, are not part of capital income in the National
Income Statistics. We therefore increased parameter α from 0.35 to 0.45 and parameterized
a new economy with a higher capital share. If we use Gollin’s (2002) adjustment and assume
that for entrepreneurial income the mix of labor and capital is equal to that of the rest of the
economy, then the eﬀective capital income share will roughly be 0.5.25
Table 6 contains the model simulations with a higher capital share. As before the model does
a good job in accounting for the size of the informal sector across countries. Corruption is the
main factor explaining the diﬀerence in the size of the informal sector between Mediterranean
Europe and the United States. With respect to Peru, the results suggest a stronger role of
ﬁnancial market imperfections compared to the ﬁndings in table 5. Corruption, however, is
still important quantitatively to explain the diﬀerence in the informal sector size between Peru
and the United States
Regarding diﬀerences in output per capita the model explains a higher fraction of the
diﬀerences in international income.26 For Mediterranean Europe, for instance, the model with
a higher capital share suggests that corruption and credit market imperfections accounts for
all the diﬀerence in observed output per capita between this region and the United States.
This is not the same for Peru. In this case there is still an important part of the observed
diﬀerence in income that is not accounted by corruption and enforcement. We also simulated
the model with a higher capital income share α = 0.55, which implies an eﬀective capital share
of roughly α = 0.6 using Gollin’s (2002) adjustment. The same pattern arises: (i) diﬀerences
in the informal sector can be accounted by corruption and credit market imperfections; (ii) the
model is able to explain a higher diﬀerence in observed international incomes.27
5 Concluding remarks and policy implications
This paper contributes to the literature by characterizing how government policies and institu-
tions interact with the distribution of wealth and entrepreneurial ability in a general equilibrium
model with formal and informal sectors, corruption, and contractual imperfections. Formal en-
trepreneurs have better access to outside ﬁnance. The quantitative exercises suggest that:
25In this case, ς = 0.00017, α = 0.45, β = 0.45, φ = 0.25, and  = 5.33. γ, τ, and r have the same values as
before.
26Notice that we have to subtract output by investment in intangible capital to make the model compatible
with the observed GDP, since national accounts do not measure this investment (Parente and Prescott, 2000).
We do this by using the total amount of capital in the economy, and assuming that the interest rate is the
same for the physical and intangible capital. Both forms of capital fully depreciate between two periods. The
last assumption implies that KP
KI = αP
αI , where αi is the factor income share of capital i = P,I. In table 6 we
assumed that αP = 0.20 and α = 0.25.
27In this case the economy with corruption and enforcement levels as those observed in Peru will be roughly
25% as rich as the United States.
16Table 6: Higher capital share (α = 0.45). Empirical data and simulation results for reference economies. Mediterranean Europe comprises Italy, Portugal
and Spain.
Informal Output per capita,
sector size, % of US level
φ ς
y % of oﬃcial
output Total Oﬃcial
Baseline case 0.25 0.005 10 100 100
Mediterranean Europe (data) 0.209 0.18 24 62 55
Simulation
1) Enforcement 0.209 0.005 12.9 84 83
2) Corruption 0.25 0.18 20.4 87 80
3) Enforcement and corruption 0.209 0.18 25.5 75 62
Peru (data) 0.13 0.20 60 11 8
Simulation
1) Enforcement 0.13 0.005 27 65 55
2) Corruption 0.25 0.2 23 79 71
3) Enforcement and Corruption 0.13 0.20 54 54 32
1
7i. Regulation costs rather than limited enforcement in ﬁnancial contracts account for a
larger part of the diﬀerence in the size of the shadow economy between Mediterranean
Europe and the United States.
ii. In countries with very weak enforcement, such as Peru, credit market imperfection ex-
plains roughly 50% of the diﬀerence in the informal sector size, while corruption costs
explain the other half.
iii. Productivity gains from improving the enforcement system and decreasing start up costs
are sizeable. The model suggests that contractual imperfections and corruption costs
explain roughly 60% of the diﬀerence in international incomes. When we increase the
capital share to include intangible capital, then corruption and credit market imperfec-
tions account for about 75% of the diﬀerences in per capita income across countries.
In order to investigate the policy implications of the model it is important to understand
the real counterpart of parameters ς and φ. Parameter ς measures the barriers to legality.
It corresponds to costs and procedures to comply with government requirements to start a
business. These costs deter entrepreneurs from becoming formal and are most of them sunk.
Djankov et al. (2002), for instance, show that in Italy entrepreneurs on average need to follow 16
procedures, pay US$ 3946 in fees, and wait roughly 62 business days to acquire legal status. In
Canada, however, the process needs only 2 procedures, takes two days and costs around US$280
in fees. Parameter φ, on the other hand, is a proxy for legal failures in ﬁnancial markets. When
ﬁnancial markets operate poorly, capital is misallocated and lucrative investment opportunities
are forgone. According to De Soto (2000), capital markets fail in developing countries for two
main reasons. First, the majority of residents in developing countries do not have legal tender
of their property and therefore cannot use their assets as collateral for a loan to convert it into
capital – notice that this is related to parameter ς. Second, even when their assets are formally
registered their properties and ﬁnancial contracts are not well enforced (idem, parameter φ).
Policies should therefore simplify the entry process, decrease bureaucracy and provide legal
tender to informal assets. Moreover, a set of complementary institutional reforms to secure
properties and debt contracts are needed, such as reforms of bankruptcy laws, banking reg-
ulation, and judiciary and enforcement systems. Our quantitative experiments suggest that
policies that decrease regulation and improve the functioning of credit markets might have
important eﬀects on the size of the informal sector and productivity, especially in developing
countries. These policies, however, are not easy to implement since they will change the status
quo of politicians and bureaucrats who are the main beneﬁciaries from high regulation costs
(Djankov et al., 2002) and a weak legal system. Path dependence in economic institutions is
an important issue, but it is not the objective of this paper.
Our model could also be used to investigate related questions. One of them is the long-run
eﬀect of tax reforms on tax evasion (size of the informal sector) and productivity. Intuitively,
for instance, a tax on ﬁnancial intermediation might not only decrease capital per capita, but
also have an eﬀect on the occupational choice of the agents, preventing agents from becoming
formal entrepreneurs. In addition, it will be interesting to consider an enforcement mechanism
with not only the degree of creditor protection (φ) – variable part, but also with a ﬁxed cost
to use the enforcement system (court), which is independent of the debtor’s output (Krasa
and Villamil, 2000, Krasa et al., 2004). In fact, the nature of the judicial enforcement system
in most economies embodies characteristics of both assumptions. Although both issues are
interesting topics we see them as beyond the objective of this paper. We leave them and other
questions for future research.
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A Kuhn-Tucker conditions for problem (8)
The Lagrangean associated with problem (8) is
Lj = πj(aj + lj,x;w) − r(aj + lj + ςIj=F)
+ λj[Ij=Fφπj(aj + lj,x;w) − r(lj + ςIj=F)] + χj[b − aj].
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂Lj
∂lj
= πj1(aj + lj,x;w) − r + λj[Ij=Fφπj1(aj + lj,x;w) − r] ≤ 0, (15)
∂Lj
∂aj
= πj1(aj + lj,x;w) − r + λj[Ij=Fφπj1(aj + lj,x;w)] − χj ≤ 0, (16)
λj[Ij=Fφπj(aj + lj,x;w) − r(lj + Ij=Fς)] = 0, (17)




lj = 0, aj ≥ 0,
∂Lj
∂aj
aj = 0, λj ≥ 0, χj ≥ 0,
along with the incentive compatible constraint and the upper limit on aj. If the entrepreneur
is credit constrained, λj > 0, that is, he would be better oﬀ if the credit constraint were eased.
Notice ﬁrst that, from (17), lI = 0. We know that πF1(k∗
F(x;w),x;w) = r and πF1(aF +lF,x;w)
is decreasing with lF. Notice that aF + lF ≤ k∗
F(x;w), since k∗
F(x;w) is the unconstrained
optimal level of capital. Then, equation (16) implies χF > 0, which implies by (18) that
aF = b.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Continuity of Vj(b,x;w) follows from the Maximum Theorem and diﬀerentiability from Theorem
4.11 of Stokey and Lucas (1989). From the envelope theorem it is easily seen that, provided
x > 0,
Vj2(b,x;w) = πj2(b + lj(b,x;w),x;w)(1 + λjφIj=F) > 0,
Vj3(b,x;w) = πj3(b + lj(b,x;w),x;w)(1 + λjφIj=F) < 0,
If b ≤ k∗(x;w), then
Vj1(b,x;w) = πj1(b + lj(b,x;w),x;w)(1 + λjφIj=F) > 0.
When b > k∗
j(x;w), then by deﬁnition of k∗
j(x;w) the net income from entrepreneurship cannot
increase and Vj1(b,x;w) = 0. lI(b,x;w) = 0 since there is no borrowing in the informal sector.
For b > k∗
F(x;w) it is also obvious that lF(b,x;w) + aF(b,x;w) = k∗
F(x;w). When agents are
credit constrained, the incentive compatible constraint holds with equality and








By condition (15), we have that r −φπF1(kF,x;w) =
πF1(kF,x;w)−r
λF . Since this is for constrained







C Proof of Lemma 2
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where j = argmaxj∈{I,F}{Vj(b,x;w)}, in all points where be(x;w) is diﬀerentiable. This is
negative from Lemma 1.
Deﬁne
G(b,x;w) = VF(b,x;w) − VI(b,x;w).









































































Since λF ≥ 0, this implies that the numerator of
∂bs(x;w)
∂x is always positive for VF(b,x;w) ≥
VI(b,x;w). For a given b, l increases and λ decreases with x, which implies that for suﬃciently
high x the denominator is negative and
∂bs(x;w)
∂x is positive (see ﬁgure 1).
D Proof of Proposition 4
First we need to show that, for every bequest distribution, there exists a ﬁnite equilibrium wage
rate that clears the labor market. Given the bequest and ability distributions, W and Γ, deﬁne












The excess demand ED(w) is continuous since both nj(x;w) and Vj(b,x;w) are continuous
in w (see equation (4) and Lemma 1). In addition, nj(x;w) and Vj(b,x;w) are also strictly
decreasing in w. Notice that as w goes to zero, no agent wants to become a worker, Vj(b,x;w)
is unbounded and ED(w) > 0. Analogously, when w increases, then ED(w) < 0. Therefore,
by continuity of ED(w) there must be some w∗ such that ED(w∗) = 0.
It remains to show that w∗ ∈ [w,w], where w > 0 and w < ∞. Let us consider an initial
bequest distribution that assigns zero bequest to all agents. Set EF(w) is the measure of all
agents for suﬃciently small w as long as φ > 0. In this case, the equilibrium wage rate, w,
is positive and ﬁnite, as stated in the previous paragraph. Since the wage rate is positive,
next periods’ bequests will all be positive. Therefore, the set of possible occupational choices
cannot shrink, and might even expand. This implies that for the previous wage rate w, the
excess demand is nonnegative, ED(w) ≥ 0, which in turn means that for this new bequest
distribution the wage rate that clears the labor market is w0 ≥ w. Consequently, w > 0 is the
lowest equilibrium wage rate for any initial distribution.
Now suppose an initial bequest distribution that assigns b0 to all agents such that b0 ≥
k∗
j(x;w). By the ﬁrst argument in this proof, there exists a positive and ﬁnite equilibrium
wage rate, w < ∞. In this case, no agent is credit constrained. Either the smallest bequest,
(1−γ)(w+rb0), is higher than b0, in which case the next periods’ equilibrium wage rate will be
the same; or it is smaller than b0 and the set of occupation choices might shrink. Therefore, for
this new wealth distribution ED(w) ≤ 0. In this case the new equilibrium wage rate is w0 ≤ w.
We can thus conclude that wt ∈ [w,w] for all t. The maximum possible bequest is thus b
such that




j(x;w),x;w)} + rb), (20)
where we assume that (1 − γ)r < 1. On the other hand the minimum bequest is
b = (1 − γ)(w + rb) (21)
Deﬁne Z = [b,b] and zt = (bt,xt). Z is compact. Deﬁne the measurable space (Z,B), where
B is the Borel algebra for the set. Deﬁne Λ(Z,B) as the set of all possible probability measures
23deﬁned on the measurable space (Z,B). For instance, Wt, which speciﬁes the probability of
each event in B at time t, belongs to Λ(Z,B). Measure Wt deﬁnes a non-stationary transition
probability function,
Pt(bt,A) = Pr{bt+1 ∈ A|bt},
for any (bt,A) in (Z,B). Function Pt assigns a probability to event A for the descendant of
an agent that has bequest bt but does not know yet xt. We want to show that the operator





where Pt is the transition function deﬁned above, has a unique ﬁxed point T ∗W = W for any
Borel subset A ∈ B, given the initial bequest distribution W0. (T ∗Wt)(A) can be interpreted
as the probability that the next period’s state lies in A according to the present period’s
distribution. Of course, T ∗Wt = Wt+1. Notice ﬁrst that wt is well deﬁned for every distribution
Wt, as we argued previously. Second, we know that bt+1 = h(zt;wt), where h(zt;wt) = (1 −
γ)Y (zt;wt) (see equation 13), is increasing in zt for any wt, and Z is compact. Operator
(Tf)(bt) =
R
f(bt+1)Pt(bt,dbt+1), deﬁned for any bounded function f : B(Z) → B(Z), where
B(Z) is the set of real-valued bounded functions deﬁned on Z, is the conditional expectation of
function f at t+1 given that the state at t is bt. Since, for any wage rate wt ∈ [w,w], h(zt,ut)
is bounded and increasing in bt, and xt+1 is independent of bt, the conditional expectation of
f(bt+1) on bt is also increasing and bounded provided that f is increasing. Intuitively, this
means that, given the equilibrium wage rate wt, an agent’s descendant would never be worse
oﬀ in terms of the expected value of bt+1 if, for any ε > 0, the agent’s state were bt + ε instead
of bt. As function Tf is increasing, T ∗ is increasing and Pt is a monotonic transition function.28
By Corollary 2 of Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), there is a ﬁxed point for map T ∗.
It remains to show that Pt satisﬁes the Monotone Mixing Condition (MMC). First, deﬁne
Pt+n(bt,A) = Pr{(bt+n) ∈ A|bt}. This is the n-step transition function beginning at t. We must
show that the transition function Pt+n satisﬁes, for all t,
Pt+N(b,[ba,b]) >  and Pt+N(b,[b,ba]) > 
for some ba ∈ Z,  > 0, and N ∈ N. Let us, for simplicity and without loss of generality, omit
subscript t. Let w be the wage rate associated with the ﬁxed point of map T ∗, W. Deﬁne the
minimum stationary bequest bl such that bl = (1−γ)(w+rbl). Let ba = (1−γ)(w+rbl)+% for
some small % > 0. We now show that there is a positive probability that the Nth descendent
of an agent with b = b receives a bequest above ba. Notice ﬁrst that the agent’s descendants
will have bequest in the vicinity of bl in ﬁnite time because they will all be workers. Since the
measure of sets E(w) and Ec(w) is non-zero and constant (as the labor market clears with wage
in [w,w]), and ability is independent across generations, there is a positive probability that a
worker becomes entrepreneur and vice-versa. Suppose that agents with ability in the vicinity of
x and bequest in the vicinity of bl cannot have descendants that become entrepreneurs. Since
all agents’ descendants face a positive probability of having bequest in the vicinity of bl in ﬁnite
time (as they can have successive low x’s), this implies that the measure of agents (workers) in
the vicinity of bl is 1, a contradiction to the fact that E(w) has non-zero measure. Therefore,
agents with ability in the vicinity of x and bequest in the vicinity of bl have descendants that
become entrepreneurs. Moreover, they can become so in the following generation. This implies
that they can also have bequest higher than ba > bl as long as they have a suﬃciently high
x, in which case they have high credit limits. Starting from b = b is easier: a succession
of low x’s leaves the agent’s descendants with bequest lower than ba, as they will become
28See Stokey and Lucas (1989, pages 220 and 379).
24Table 7: Basic statistics, changes in parameters relative to the baseline.
Informal Total output Oﬃcial output % of Income
sector size, per capita, per capita, entrep. Gini
% output % of baseline % of baseline
Baseline 10 100 100 9 34
Lifespan = 45 21 91 84 9.1 31
γ = 1 0 97 107 6.0 40
γ = 0.7 46 106 80 8.8 27
φ = 0 - 65 0 12 28
φ = 0.3 7.4 106 109 8.1 33
workers and remain so until one of them gets a suﬃciently high x. Therefore, by Theorem 2
of Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), there exists a unique time invariant distribution W and
associated equilibrium wage w, such that from any initial distribution W0, the operator T ∗Wt
converges to W.
E Sensitivity analysis
This model does not display wage inequality. This could be introduced by means of a “working
ability” that would diﬀerentiate among workers. This inequality, however, would simply reﬂect
the randomness of working productivity, which is not important to our purposes. We could have
increased inequality by increasing the curvature of the ability distribution (i.e., parameter ).
The quantitative exercises are roughly the same for a parameterization with higher inequality
(income Gini in range 0.40–0.44).29
Table 7 shows some quantitative results when we change other parameters of the model. The
second row shows the impact of increasing the lifespan to 45 years. The number of entrepreneurs
does not change, whereas, as expected, output falls 9 percent.
The third row displays the case where agents are not altruistic. The eﬀect is large on all
variables except output. The informal sector is null because there is no bequest in this econ-
omy and every entrepreneur needs outside resources to undertake a project. Notice, however,
that with γ = 1 and φ = 0 the economy would collapse because everybody would be credit-
constrained. In this case, ﬁnancial constraints could explain any diﬀerence in the size of the
informal sector and on output across countries. But this is a rather extreme case. The fourth
row shows the results for a higher propensity to leave bequest. Output is higher because agents
are less credit constrained and as a consequence productivity increases. Notice that the exis-
tence of equilibrium requires that γ > 1−1/r. The model therefore displays some sensitivity to
parameter γ, but there is no reason to assume that the altruism degree varies across countries.
The last two rows of table 7 consider two extreme cases: one with an enforcement such that
the entrepreneur keeps only 70 percent of the assets in case of default (against 75 percent in the
baseline), and another with no enforcement of debt contracts. The informal sector size varies
from 7.4 percent of measured output to full informalization, while output per capita varies
from 106 to 65 percent of the baseline economy. This conﬁrms our previous ﬁndings that credit
market policies can account for the diﬀerences in the size of the informal sector, especially for
countries with low enforcement, but just part of the diﬀerences in output per capita.30
29For the sake of space, we omit these results but we can provide them upon request.
30When φ goes from 0 to 0.13, total output per capita increases 79 pp, while when it goes from 0.13 to 0.25
total output increases by only 21 pp.
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